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The asymmetry between the patient as a layman and the physician as an expert is a key element in health economics. 
However, a change to a higher degree of patient autonomy has taken place. Furthermore, there is a consensus in a 
positive correlation between general education and productivity of medical care. This paper focuses on the individual 
investments  of  laymen  in  specific  medical  education a s  a  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  i n  w h i c h  t h e  e x - p o s t  s t r a t e g ies  of  the 
individual are consultation and self-care as imperfect substitutes. It is assumed that specific knowledge increases the 
self-diagnosis competence (self-protection) and the self-care productivity (self-insurance) as dimensions of autonomy. 
The analysis is divided into two forms of ex-post decision making according to individual rationality: 1. ambiguity 2. 
uncertainty. An elaboration of necessary conditions for investments in education is undertaken. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In economical literature a lot of research has been done concerning the impact of un-
certainty with regards to the factual health stage and the eﬀectiveness of medical care
in which Grossman’s (1972) health production function is often used as a basis.1 The
demand underlies a trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent objectives including diﬀerent kind of in-
vestments in health. In this context, education is mostly discussed as a general and not
speciﬁed input to decrease the rate of depreciation of health, to increase productivity of
care and to reduce uncertainty leading to an increase of allocative eﬃciency of demand.
Empirical evidence about a positive relation between health and general education is also
given as presented by Cutler and Lleras Muney (2006) as a survey.
Taking this positive relationship as granted and acknowledging the increase of im-
portance of patient autonomy in health related sciences this paper discusses investments
in, not general, but speciﬁc education as an individual decision problem. Very speciﬁc
education has attracted less interest in economical literature. Speciﬁcally, education is
related to a decision in a situation of an acute indisposition ex-post, in which consultation
and self-care are alternative strategies. Then, self-diagnosis competence and the self-care
productivity are speciﬁc dimensions of patient autonomy.
There is an extensive discussion in the medical and ethical literature in the ﬁeld of
informed and educated individuals/patients driven by a change of the classical pater-
nalistic framework of a patient-physician relationship (PPR) to a more patient centered
conception (Taylor (2009)). The focus is on shared decision making, either with general
information to enforce self-help for patients who encounter a speciﬁc clinical situation or
with very speciﬁc information in the form of decision aids which alleviates choice between
treatments (Llewellyn-Thomas (1995)). Generally, a transition to consumer behaviour
with a higher degree of patient autonomy and personal responsibility based on patient
empowerment is in focus. From an ethical point of view this empowerment means a
strengthening of self-awareness, knowledge and skills to improve the individual decision
competence which, for instance, can be of special importance for chronic illnesses (Ander-
son and Funnell (2005)). Haug and Levin (1981) already described self-care and eﬀort in
education as crucial elements for an increase of patient autonomy. Parker (2006) identiﬁes
health literacy as essential for the individual to participate within a health care system
to have access, to navigate and also to manage self-care. To empower the individual to
become a more autonomously acting, informed or reﬂexive individual it is necessary to use
diﬀerent sources of information such as the Internet or more traditional sources (Henwood
et al. (2003)). There is also some empirical evidence that information inﬂuences medi-
cal demand, as from Wagner et al. (2001), who analyzes investments in sources such as
1See amongst others Muurinen (1982), Wagstaﬀ (1986), van Doorslaer (1987), Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ
(1989), Selden (1992), Chang (1996), Liljas (1997), Picone et al. (1997).
2books and the Internet and ﬁnds a potential to decrease medical demand. Kenkel (1990)
analyzes symptoms as imperfect information as a basis for demanding a physician or not.
He ﬁnds that the more severe a health status, the higher the value of acquiring further
information. An increase of available information is also able to increase medical demand.
A more speciﬁc contribution regarding patient education is delivered by Price and Simon
(2009). They show that speciﬁc proposals, according to the choice of appropriate treat-
ments produced by medical research, have a positive impact on the individual medical
behaviour. However, this relates more to the level of the individual general education.
This can be regarded as an indicator for the positive relation between the converting of
speciﬁc information into a concrete behaviour and the necessity of a capacity to aﬀord
such a conversion, maybe as education in more speciﬁc medical knowledge.2
The PPR is characterized as asymmetric due to an information gradient between an
expert and a laymen. This is a simple translation of a paternalistic relation described
in the medical literature. Arrow (1963) already deﬁned the information competence of
medical specialist as costly due to investments in a professional education in which the
complexity of information and its value increase with the severity of the illness. A per-
fect medical education for every individual is ineﬃcient, therefore, work sharing in health
care makes more sense. Despite Arrows point of ineﬃciency he already thought about
diﬀerentiation of quality in which diﬀerent trained suppliers could also oﬀer diﬀerenti-
ated medical supply (see also Smith (2005)). Vuori (1980) discusses the optimal but not
maximal supply of medical care in which the general choice between alternative forms of
medical care is directed to an optimization of care.
Related to this are the preferences of the patient as it has already been discussed by
Feldstein (1968). The resource allocation within the health-care system should be directed
to the individuals’ preferences to maximize welfare. Feldstein did not intend to implement
self-care as a further alternative. However, during the last decades, both objects, pref-
erences and patient autonomy, have developed a complementary relation to each other.
Hence, self-care as an alternative use of resources turns into a legitimate subject. In this
context the bounded rationality of an individual is of importance. Culyer (1971) discusses
the rationality of a patients’ ability to decide according to preferences and the problem
of behaving in this way. Amongst others, there is uncertainty about the assessment of
the actual illness and the knowledge about an adequate treatment, or a rational choice
of it respectively. Speciﬁc medical education should be directed to an improvement of
these responsibilities. Lee (1995) delivers an interesting idea of a threshold determined
by illness severity and socio-economic variables for choosing a consultation. His idea is
that the patient only generates demand due to a lack of information. Otherwise, the
2However, Price and Simon also give alternative explanations that because more highly educated
people choose more sophisticated physicians. Furthermore, education is a proxy for income and access to
the physicians. Hence, education and the ability to convert information is a possible but not necessary
channel.
3patient could take care of himself. However, self-care is not discussed. The patient is
able to identify the diagnosis but cannot produce adequate treatment. Lee focuses on the
uncertainty the patient has according to the physician’s supply. However, my approach
has the individual and the self-care strategy in focus in which the physician within the
consultation strategy represents a perfect agent.
Derived from the discussion above I am going to discuss consultation and self-care as
a polarized diﬀerentiation of medical supply. Given an increase of the individual produc-
tivity of medical care in general education I am going to discuss individual investments in
speciﬁc medical education as an individual decision problem. A general level of education
and the simple act of collecting information are not suﬃcient for an increase in auton-
omy. More speciﬁc knowledge with corresponding investments are necessary to handle
speciﬁc information. Investments imply a loss of money and time in order to purchase
professional teaching in medical subjects for laymen. While the kind of investments in
education, presented with the empirical literature above, is often directed to the individ-
ual behaviour within a PPR; I want to discuss a more extreme position of the individual,
namely to (partially) replace physician contact with self-care. If the main ﬁelds of a
physician’s competence are diagnosis and therapy, education must increase ”self-diagnosis
competence” and ”productivity of self-care”. Self-diagnosis competence can be interpreted
as self-protection in the sense of a reduction of the risk of a false diagnosis aﬃliated with
a loss of utility through the wrong choice of consultation or self-care. Productivity of self-
care can be interpreted as self-insurance, which means a reduction of utility loss through
an illness. However, a total replacement of a physician seems to be unrealistic for which
reason self-care must be interpreted as an imperfect substitute. Imperfect means that
self-care is not appropriate for each kind of illness. A diﬀerentiation between illnesses is
necessary according to the real eﬀectiveness of education.
To put it in a nutshell, education is directed on as extension of treatment alterna-
tives through self-care and an improvement of liability through self-diagnosis competence
leading to a more eﬃcient allocation of resources in medical care.
The decision problem is modeled in a framework of expected utility and is based on a
decision-tree framework.3 There are two decisions: a) choice of self-care or consultation
ex-post, b) investments in education ex-ante. The discussion in this paper is divided
into diﬀerent decision structures, 1.) ambiguity ex-post, 2.) uncertainty ex-post. The
separation is motivated by a fundamental distinction of decision behaviour. The diﬀerence
is the use of probabilities for the decision between self-care and consultation. While under
3In this context Pauker and Kassirer (1980) discuss a framework of decision threshold in health care.
Eeckhoudt et al. (1984) and Eeckhoudt (2002) also analyze the decision behaviour under uncertainty
also focused on diagnostic tests and conditional decisions under imperfect information. More general
studies and useful research of the basical techniques of information values under imperfect information
are delivered by La Valle (1968) and Hirshleifer and Riley (1979).
4ambiguity these are not implemented and the decision is based on the ﬁxing of a self-
diagnosed illness and the application of a decision rule, under uncertainty probabilities
are directly used to derive a decision.
The results can be summarized as follows. An individual welfare gain is possible, how-
ever, as long as self-care is an alternative to consultation and self-diagnosis competence
is imperfect, the ﬁrst best solution cannot be achieved. Basically, the incentive to invest
in education must be separated into the eﬀectiveness of self-insurance and self-protection
to increase self-care productivity and to improve self-diagnosis competence. A utility loss
through a false self-diagnosis stimulates education. The illness severity and risk aver-
sion are ambiguous in their inﬂuence. Furthermore, education is inhibited if consultation
realizes diﬀerent forms of dominance either based on a subjective pessimism and error
probabilities or on an objective factual superior utility. Education can eliminate domi-
nance but induce a potential loss in the case of a false self-diagnosis. Then, education is
not beneﬁcial necessarily and can also be understood as a measure to reduce the level of
patent autonomy. If a decision takes place under uncertainty, the decision is conditional-
ized on the use of information about the quality of self-diagnosis. An information value
is generated by the use of the symptoms as an imperfect indicator which is inﬂuenced
by education. Finally, a threshold value of an objective illness probability for an indi-
vidual welfare gain through education can be calculated, which is extended if imperfect
information is used.
The outline of this paper follows. Chapter two discusses the basic elements of the
model. Chapter three analyzes education under ambiguity and chapter four under uncer-
tainty. Chapter ﬁve summarizes the results.
2T h e t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k
I only consider the patient as an active decider. The physician is a perfect agent. The
decision is made with a preference to avoid a consultation if it is unnecessary.
Uncertainty and ex-post strategies
There are two health states: 1.) severe sickness H1,2 . ) b a n a ls i c k n e s sH2, with ¯ H>
H2 >H 1 and ¯ H as health state, which excludes any form of sickness. H1 occurs with an
a-priori objective probability π and H2 with 1 − π.H e n c e ,t h eo c c u r r e n c eo fa ni l l n e s si s
certain, however, not its severity. The individual is at least crudely informed, speciﬁcally
about the own health history and is therefore able to deviate π ex-ante.
Self-diagnosis
In the ex-post case of an acute indisposition, the patient has to assess the current health
5status and decide, whether it is H1 or H2.4 Let H substantiate into H1,e . g . ah e a r t
attack, typically connected with pain in the left arm. This symptom is seen as informa-
tion, however, as it is assumed in this framework, a perfect one for a physician and an
imperfect for the individual. The latter could also derive a pulled muscle or something
similar. The imperfection arises through the bounded competence to draw a correct con-
clusion. Then, beside π,s u b j e c t i v ee r r o rp r o b a b i l i t i e s1 − πi regarding the self-diagnosis
exist. In medical language, the decision can be correct or false positive or negative (tab.
1). πi depends on x with πi(x1,...,xm) in which x represents individual characteristics,
Illness Self diagnosis (sd) πi type of diagnosis
H1 H1 π1 correct positive (negative) sd H1 (H2)
H1 H2 1 − π1 false positive (negative) sd H2 (H1)
H2 H2 π2 correct positive (negative) sd H2 (H1)
H2 H1 1 − π2 false positive (negative) sd H1 (H2)
Table 1: Types of self-diagnosis
e.g. age, general education etc. which inﬂuence the capability of a correct self-diagnosis
without any speciﬁc medical education. There is a stochastically dependence between Hi
and πi. The probability of a correct self-diagnosis depends on the factual health status.
In principle, π1 = π2 is possible. However, this means a loss of information. Diﬀerent
probabilities represent a diﬀerent illness perception. A factual situation H1 can be under-
rated because symptoms typically seem to be very simple and suggest H2. Otherwise, H2
often has symptoms with a higher degree of an acute indisposition like qualm, headache
or fever. Furthermore, medical education for laymen can diﬀer in its potential to increase
self diagnosis competence. A layman diagnosis of H1 should be more diﬃcult than of H2
and depends on the learning capacity. For further discussion, π1 <π 2 is assumed. The
chance of a correct self-diagnosis in the case of H2 is higher than for H1.5
Ex-post utility
The utility states are deﬁned in tab 2. They depend on the type of illness and type of
care with u￿(y) > 0 and u￿￿(y) < 0 and y as net-income. Y is the gross-income with
Y ￿ > 0,Y￿￿ < 0.H e a l t hi sa ni n p u tf o rY and produced by H +q with q as medical input
either through consultation or self-care. α and γ are the marginal costs separated in c
and sc. N and M are ﬁxed costs which can be interpreted very diﬀerently. M could be
waiting time given a speciﬁc medical provider and N could represent costs of searching for
4In this context a self-diagnosis H1 does not primarily mean a real diagnosis, but an exclusion of H2
due to the high degree of diﬃculty for laymen to give a correct diagnosis in the case of a critical illness.
5Ad e p e n d e n c eπ￿
1(π) > 0 in which π￿
2(π) < 0 is conceivable. An increase in π can increase the
sensitivity of the individual if H1 is the factual illness, e.g. through a speciﬁc exposition and disposition
to be sick. However, there is also an increase of sensitivity for a false positive diagnosis of H1 in the case
H2. Otherwise, the opposite can be the case of π is low. Then, a false self-diagnosis according to H1 can
be supported. This is not equal to a stochastically dependence of the probabilities.
6consultation (c) self-care (sc)
H1 uH1
c = u(Yc(H1 + q1) − γq1 − M) uH1
sc = u(Ysc(λH1 + q1λ) − αqsc − γq1λ − N − M − S)
H2 uH2
c = u(Yc(H2 + q2) − γq2 − M) uH2
sc = u(Ysc(H2 + δqsc) − αqsc − N)
Table 2: Speciﬁcation of utility for consultation and self-care
adequate sc.F u r t h e r m o r e ,N can cover costs connected with a certiﬁcate of incapacity
to work, which cannot be issued in the case of sc.I n a d d i t i o n , c o s t s c a n b e c o n n e c t e d
to a kind of inconvenience which arises through the habit of c in the case of illness. The
latter point can be very diﬀerent between individuals. Maybe elderly search for contact
to a physician, sometimes only for a social contact. Other individuals are very sensitive
when they fall ill, accompanied with an urgent personal requirement to be attended to by
ap h y s i c i a n . 6
The physician’s competence of diagnosis is perfect and ones productivity is assumed to
be one. δ represents the sc-productivity for H2. The sc-productivity for H1 is assumed as
zero (see below). The patient is able to assess the productivity, which reﬂects a crude idea
about the own competencies in self-care. δ can take any value also above one. Someone
could argue that δ<1 is necessary because the physician would at least give the same
advise the patient would realize with sc.B u ti tc a na l s ob ea r g u e dt h a te s p e c i a l l yi nt h e
case of banal illnesses, the patient knows more about his physiological and psychological
conditions and also about appropriate provisions, e. g. through experiences and a better
assessment of the individual requirements. This is a very fundamental aspect, also in the
ethical discussion about patient autonomy, in which, at ﬁrst, the patient has to perceive
himself before contacting an external person for care.
The optimal demand ex-post with y as the state dependent net-income is given by:
Y
Hi￿

















The marginal productivity of the health status must equalize the marginal costs. (1)
is the condition for demand of consultation. Given the diagnosis of the physician the
demand can be diﬀered in dependence of the diagnosis. To simplify matters, Hi
c+qi
c = ¯ H.
The physician is always able to recover perfect health.
The demand of sc is more speciﬁc. If sc is chosen the individual is still not informed
about the factual illness. However, due to a productivity of zero in a case of H1,t h e
6Cauley (1987) identiﬁes a time price as an equivalent to loss of income during demand of medical
care. See also Wagner et al. (2001) who delivers some evidence for M.
7individual only demands for H2 if sc is chosen with (2) as condition. The marginal costs
are adjusted up- or downwards by δ ￿=1 .B e s i d ea n yﬁ x e dc o s t s ,a sl o n ga sγ<(α/δ) the
net-income for sc(H2) is smaller than for c(H2) with uH2
sc <u H2
c .F o rγ>(α/δ), uH2
sc >u H2
c
must be valid. The latter means an equalization of gross-incomes Yc( ¯ H)=Ysc( ¯ H). How-
ever, as long as δ<1, this equalization is only based on a cost-advantage with α<γ .I f
δ>1, it is also based on a reduced demand with q∗
2 >q ∗
sc.B o t hc a s e sg e n e r a t ear e d u c t i o n
of variable costs if self-care is chosen. Finally, uH1
sc is composited as follows. Due to the
reason of work-sharing and knowledge about u, uH1
c >u H1
sc is necessary. It follows, if H1
is the factual illness but sc is chosen, the choice can only be based on a false positive self-
diagnosis H2. The demand is based on (2). Hence, qsc in uH1
sc is conditional on the false
self-diagnosis. The productivity of qsc is zero leading to costs αqsc and N without a health
increasing eﬀect. As a result a depreciation of H1 with λ<1 with a following choice of
c is assumed with an optimal demand (3). Additionally, S ≥ 0 are ﬁxed costs through a











sc . The background is a remaining division of work, which does not allow a sub-
stitution of c for each kind of illness.
As discussed in this paper, there is certainty about the utility within each health stage
and therefore about the eﬀectiveness of medical care. Uncertainty arises through the risk
of a false self-diagnosis and consequently an inadequate or not utility maximizing demand.
Patient autonomy and information ex-post
How is the ex-post decision and information structured? From an ex-ante point of view
the individual can assess both π and πi. However, this knowledge can be diﬀerent ex-post.
Diﬀerent to an ex-ante situation of perfect health the individual is in a situation of an
acute indisposition ex-post.
In chapter three the decision takes place under ambiguity. A kind of decoupling of
ex-ante information and ex-post behaviour takes place. The patient is not aware of any
probabilities. However, the individual is always aware of the given symptom and forced
to generate a self-diagnosis. After deriving a self-diagnosis the individual is also aware
about the strategies one can choose and also about the corresponding utility values within
each strategy. However, at this point the decision takes place under a reduced form of
rationality. The individual is not aware about the amount of risk of having Hi and the
risk of a false self-diagnosis. The individual must choose a strategy with awareness of all
possible cases under use of a decision rule under ambiguity. It follows, that the stochastical
8dependence πi and Hi has no technical consequences.
The discussion is extended in chapter four. The decision takes place under uncertainty.
π and πi as imperfect information are known ex-post as a higher degree of rationality. A
corresponding application of a conditional decision is necessary.
Finally, an important discussion regarding the concept of paternalism and autonomy
must be conducted. Paternalism means that a decision competence does not exist within
a PPR. The patient is in a situation of ”unconsciousness”, which brings the physician
in a situation of a personal guardian. At ﬁrst glance, there is no conscious decision
for or against c.H o w e v e r ,t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f u t i l i t y p r e s e n t s a s i m p l e s e t o f s t r a t e g i e s
- c or sc.I n t h e c a s e o f p u r e p a t e r n a l i s m , c can be seen as dominant (tab. 3). If
c dominance non-dominance sc
H1 uH1
c > > uH1
sc
H2 uH2
c > < uH2
sc
Table 3: Dominance and non-dominance of consultation
uH2
c >u H2
sc the patient knows that c is superior to sc. The physician is always the best
alternative from a rational point of view described as paternalism in this context. Hence,
dominance arises if uH2
c >u H2
sc or Yc(H2 + q2) − Ysc(H2 + δqsc) >γ q 2 − αqsc + M − N.7
Generally, I deﬁne two diﬀerent kinds of realizing a dominance of c.1 . )G i v e nad e c i s i o n
under ambiguity, the patient always chooses c if a concrete health status is identiﬁed
and the column of dominance in tab. 3 is valid. Another source of dominance could be
the application of any kind of decision rule e.g. a subjective weighting of each utility
value with a corresponding expected utility. In both cases, the parameters within u are
in such a constellation that sc is inferior in general (e.g., low δ,h i g hN,h i g hα). 2.)
Under uncertainty ex-post dominance of c can also arise through EUc >E U sc due to the
implementation of probabilities.
In this framework, paternalism does not mean a full loss of decision competence, but
al o s so fa l t e r n a t i v es t r a t e g i e sf o rt h ep a t i e n t . A sar e s u l t ,t h ea i do fa u t o n o m ym e a n s
an abolishment of dominance in c. Then, autonomy can be interpreted as a gradual
value increasing in the number of alternatives. However, to simplify matters, only two
strategies are discussed. Autonomy is a categorical variable in the sense that someone
decides autonomically (c is non-dominant) or does not (c is dominant).
7Please note, if N<Mthen Yc(H2+q2)−Ysc(H2+δqsc) <γ q 2−αqsc and non-dominance is possible.
Someone could argue justiﬁably that in such a case, similar to sc(H1),ad e p r e c i a t i o no fh e a l t hc a p i t a l
takes place because self-care is not able to achieve ¯ H.A sac o n s e q u e n c e ,s e l f - c a r ed e c r e a s e si ni t su t i l i t y
and c turns to dominance and an elimination of N<Mas a possible case of non-dominance. However,
as can be seen in the further discussion an incentive to invest in education could still remain. A speciﬁc
implementation of this case does not inﬂuence the results signiﬁcantly, however, it adds an additional
proposition.
9The pure extension of strategies does not mean to be impeccable. A second dimension
of autonomy, self-diagnosis competence, is of importance in which it is reasonable that
a perfect competence with πi =1cannot be achieved. The absence of this ability is
sometimes a reason for paternalism and a shift from the decision competence from the
patient to the physician, for instance through a higher health care authority. Therefore,
the pure extension of alternatives is not a guarantor of utility maximizing decisions.8
Given the deﬁned dimensions of patient autonomy, speciﬁc education E has two essen-
tial eﬀects: 1.) Increase of πi with π￿
i(E) ≥ 0 and π￿￿
i (E) ≤ 0, π￿
2(E)<
>π￿
1(E);2 . )I n c r e a s e
of productivity in self-care with δ￿(E) ≥ 0 and δ￿￿(E) ≤ 0. The ﬁrst eﬀect can be de-
ﬁned as self-protection, similar to the deﬁnition of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), who deﬁnes
self-protection as a decrease of the objective illness risk π.H o w e v e r , t h e i m p r o v e m e n t
of competence of self-diagnosis also reduces a risk, although only the risk of a subopti-
mal strategy choice. The second eﬀect decreases the eﬀective marginal costs for self-care,
which can be deﬁned as self-insurance, similar to Ehrlich and Becker. This stands for a
reduction of the risky amount, speciﬁcally medical expenditures in the case of self-care.
The eﬀect on the implicit productivity of self-care for illness H1 cannot be inﬂuenced by
education. In addition, N￿(E) ≥ 0, N￿￿(E) ≤ 0 and M￿(E)=0 . Education does not have
any preventive impact (π￿(E)=0 ).
3E d u c a t i o n a n d e x - p o s t d e c i s i o n u n d e r a m b i g u i t y
The decision structure from an ex-ante point of view is given by ﬁg. 1:
-F i g u r e1-
From an ex-ante point of view, the ﬁrst best case without education is:
EUfb = πu
H1





The individual should choose the utility maximizing strategy for each health stage.
To realize (4), a perfect self-diagnosis competence is necessary.
At this point of discussion the ex-post decision takes place under ambiguity. The
decision has a sequential structure. If Hi is realized the individual is forced to generate
as e l f - d i a g n o s i s .G i v e nt h es e l f - d i a g n o s i s ,ad e c i s i o nr u l ei sn e c e s s a r yt or e a l i z ead e c i s i o n
between the strategies ex-post. In other words, the knowledge about the possibility of
af a l s es e l f - d i a g n o s i ss q u e e z e st h ei n d i v i d u a lt oa t t e n de a c ho ft h ep o s s i b l eh e a l t hs t a g e s
in the calculus. The rule used in this context is the Hurwicz decision rule (Hurwicz
8Please note, due to the static consideration of investments in education an intertemporal choice
under attention of a discounting of a future value of health is not implemented as another determinant
of autonomy. Please see for this subject inter alia Reach (2009).
10(1951)) which includes the maximin and maximax rule as extreme cases. The individual
is characterized by an intrinsic parameter of optimism θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 which is used to
weight the utility values for each strategy:
EUk(θ)=θu
H1
k +( 1− θ)u
H2
k with k = c,sc (5)
For θ =1 ,( 5 )i sEUk(θ)=u
H1
k with a corresponding choice of c due to uH1
c >u H1
sc .F o r
θ =0 ,( 5 )i sEUk(θ)=m a x {uH2
c ;uH2
sc } with a corresponding choice c or sc. The ﬁrst case
can be translated into the maximin rule with the maximum pessimism with avoidance of
the worst case uH1
sc . The latter case can be translated into the maximax rule with the
maximum optimism due the best case uH2
sc if uH2
sc >u H2
c .F r o mt h i sd e ﬁ n i t i o nd o m i n a n c e
arises either through uHi
c >u Hi
sc or through the concrete value of θ.A t h r e s h o l d l e v e l
according to θ and a choice of sc can be calculated with uH1
c −uH1
sc = a and uH2
sc −uH2
c = b
(see also Eeckhoudt (1984)):
θ
∗ <b / (a + b) (6)














c and therefore θ∗ << 0,5.
θ is assumed to be state dependent. Given H1 (H2)a ss e l f - d i a g n o s i s ,θ1 (θ2)i sr e a l i z e d .
c (sc)i sc h o s e ng e n e r a l l yi fθ∗ < (>)θi. For the further discussion the following relations
are assumed: θ∗ <θ 1, θ∗ >
<θ2.G i v e nas e l f - d i a g n o s i sHi the weight is shifted to u
Hi
k . This
assumption can be seen as the individual’s belief into the own competence of self-diagnosis.
Then, θ1 is comparably high and θ2 comparable low.
Given (4) as maximum ex-ante utility and θ2 as exogenous and characteristic for the
individual the ﬁrst best solution can also be calculated as (7):
EUfb(θ2)=πu
H1
c +( 1− π)u
H2
k (θ2) (7)




sc and θ2 <θ ∗, otherwise, (7) < (4).
Finally, under an imperfect competence of self-diagnosis ﬁg. 1 can be translated into









































c +( 1− π)u
H2
c (10)
(7) = (9) if πi =1 , otherwise, (7) > (9). (10) = (7) if uH2
c >u H2
sc or θ2 ≥ θ∗.
Hence, if any kind of dominance exists the ﬁrst best solution is achieved if θ is given as
characteristical parameter of the individual.
If θ can be inﬂuenced, (4) is the benchmark. (9) and (10) are not able to achieve
this maximum if self-care is utility maximizing for H2 and πi < 1. Then, a second-best
solution arises independently of θ2.H e n c e ,t h eﬁ r s tb e s ts o l u t i o ni sa b l et ob ea c h i e v e d
only if uH2
c >u H2
sc in which (6) and therefore (9) are not possible to be fulﬁlled. Then, (4)
= (10). Furthermore, (4) = (9) if πi =1 , uH2
c <u H2
sc and θ2 <θ ∗.
Only self-insurance
Firstly, only self-insurance is implemented with δ￿(E) > 0 and π￿
i(E)=0 . Then, the
necessary condition for education EU￿(E) > 0 under use of (8) is:
πEU
￿
H1 +( 1− π)EU
￿













k (θ2)+( 1− π2)u
H2￿
c ) (13)
with k = c,sc and u
Hi￿
k as derivatives of utility with subject to E.9 (11) represents the
expected marginal income loss or gain if education is implemented. Thereby, (12) and
(13) quotes the expected value for H1 and H2.A sl o n ga sc is dominant (11) changes to:
πu
H1￿
c +( 1− π)u
H2￿
c > 0 (14)
There is no positive eﬀect on productivity for c.H e n c e ,uHi￿
c is negative. Only expen-
ditures arise and (14) cannot be fulﬁlled. Education is left undone.
However, if c is non-dominant with uH2
sc >u H2
c and θ2 <θ ∗,( 1 3 )i sp o s i t i v ei f
π2uH2￿
sc (θ2) > −(1 − π2)uH2￿
c with uH2￿
c < 0.I fδ￿ > 0, uH2￿



















9Please note, within this paper the notation u
Hi￿
k (θ2) means not a derivative with subject to θ2 but
only the dependence of k from the value θ2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,f o rt h ef u r t h e rd i s c u s s i o n ,uHi￿
sc (θ2) and uHi
sc (θ2)














sc (y) as derivative of utility with subject to y.I n( 1 5 ) ,q￿
sc > 0 and the income
eﬀect can be positive if δ￿ and |N￿| are suﬃciently high. This case is of relevance if
M − N>0 is suﬃciently high to achieve a situation of non-dominance despite γ<α
δ.
In (16), q￿
sc < 0 and δ￿ and N￿ must be suﬃciently in their absolute value to generate a
positive income eﬀect for self-care. In both cases a compensation of E through an increase
of gross-income or a decrease of variable and ﬁxed costs can take place. Then, it depends
also on π2 whether (13) is positive.
How is the situation for a (severe illness) (condition 12)? If non-dominance arises
uH1
sc (E) >u H1
sc as long as δ￿ > 0 with uH1￿
sc (θ2)=−uH1￿
sc (y) · (αq￿
scδ￿ + N￿ +1 )> 0 and
q￿
sc < 0.A g a i n , uH1￿
c is negative. Of course, uH1
sc (E) <u H1
c (E) remains. However, a
positive income eﬀect with −π1uH1￿
c < (1 − π1)uH1￿
sc (θ2) is possible which depends on π1
and on the absolute diﬀerence of the net-incomes between both strategies. Otherwise, if
q￿
sc > 0 due to γ<α / δthe income eﬀect for sc(H1) is negative due to an increase of
variable costs αq￿
sc. It follows that (12) is positive.10
(11) is fulﬁlled with E∗
imp if there is non-dominance and the expected increase of
net-income for both health states in sc is suﬃciently high to compensate a decrease of
net-income in strategy c.
Finally, if the competence of self-diagnosis is perfect with πi =1 ,( 1 1 )c a nb es i m p l i ﬁ e d :
πu
H1￿
c +( 1− π)u
H2￿
sc (θ2) > 0 (17)
E∗




sc (θ2) > 0 and |uH2￿
c | is not too high, otherwise, E∗
imp ≤ E∗
perf.I n b o t h c a s e s
EU(E∗
perf) >E U(E∗
imp).I nt h eﬁ r s tc a s eEU(E∗
imp) exceeds the level of education under
aﬁ r s tb e s ts o l u t i o nb a s e do nπi < 1.I n t h e l a t t e r c a s e , e v e n i f i d e n t i t y b e t w e e n b o t h
levels of education exists, πi < 1 reduces the expected utility below the ﬁrst best solution.
How does risk aversion (RA) inﬂuence investments in education. For that, a linear
transformation of utility (ﬁg. 2) can be done. There is a linearity for a risk neutral
individual (RN) with (acef)a n dac o n c a v i t y( abdf)f o rR A .F o rt h ew o r s tsc(H1) and
best sc(H2) case the utilities are identical.11 However, for c(H1) (c(H2))t h eu t i l i t yf o ra
10Furthermore, please note that in a case of a dominant c without education and a non-dominance
with education, for which an increase of net-income for sc(H2) above c(H2) and θ2 <θ ∗ are necessary,
the income eﬀect changes from a negative for c(H2) to a positive for sc(H2). Then, the ﬁrst term in
(13) changes in its relevant marginal utility from uH2￿
c to uH2￿
sc in which a positive income eﬀect becomes
signiﬁcant. In (12) the situation is similar with a possible change of decision from c(H2) to a positive for
sc(H2) with the consequence of sc(H1) and an increase of the negative income eﬀect.
11This kind of illustration is taken from Eeckhoudt (2002). The position of acef can be changed, e.g.
as a linear function through the point of origin with any kind of slope also with any intersection between
13RA-individual exceeds the utility of a RN-individual with b − c (d − e).
-F i g u r e2-
















The impact of RA depends on the marginal utilities for the diﬀerent utility states.
Comparing point a and f, the following relations are valid: uH1RN￿
sc (θ2) <u H1RA￿
sc (θ2) and
uH2RN￿
sc (θ2) >u H2RA￿
sc (θ2).H e n c e ,al o s st h r o u g he d u c a t i o ni nt h ew o r s t( b e s t )c a s er e d u c e s
the incentive to invest in education more strongly under RA (RN) compared to RN (RA).
The opposite is the case for a gain through education. For strategy c the relations between
the marginal utilities depends on the absolute amount of net-income. As long as the y<￿ y
(y>￿ y), RA delivers a higher (lower) marginal utility than RN. At this point, yH1
c < ￿ y
and yH2
c > ￿ y.G i v e nt h e s er e l a t i o n so fm a r g i n a lu t i l i t i e sb e t w e e nR Aa n dR N ,R Ah a sa n
ambiguous impact.
The arrows in ﬁg. 2 illustrate the direction of income growth if education is imple-
mented. According to self-care, the increase of net-income was calculated as equal for H1
and H2.H e n c e ,u n d e rR At h ei n c e n t i v ef o re d u c a t i o ni n c r e a s e sd u et oah i g h e rm a r g i n a l
gain compared to RN if π1 is low.12 The threshold in (22) increases. However, if π1 is
high the incentive can decrease under RA. Contrary to that, for c (with the same decrease
of net-income, E), RA decreases (increases) π∗ for c(H1) (c(H2)). This is due to a lower
impact of loss for the latter under RA. The question is, whether ∆(d − e) < |∆(b − c)|.
Similar to strategy sc,t h i sr e l a t i o nm u s tb ef u l ﬁ l l e db e t w e e nal i n e a ra n dac o n c a v eu t i l i t y
function. Hence, for c,R Ad e c r e a s e st h ei n c e n t i v et oi n v e s ti ne d u c a t i o ni fπ1 and π2 are
high. Summarized, in the case of self-insurance, RA increases the incentive of education
for sc and decreases it for c. The ﬁnal answer depends on the distribution of error prob-
abilities as well as on the absolute amounts of the changes of the diﬀerences between the
utility values under RA and RN distinguished between c and sc.
Connected to RA the inﬂuence of illness severity is ambiguous for both health states.
The more severe the illness the higher is the incentive for education if the weight is on the
positive marginal income eﬀect for sc. Otherwise, for c al o ws e v e r i t yi sm o r eb e n e ﬁ c i a l .
In addition, RA inﬂuences θ∗ through uH1￿
sc >u H2￿
sc . The lower the value in the worst
case the more probable the dominance through a low θ∗.
the RN- and RA-function. However, the qualitative conclusion regarding the impact of risk aversion is
independent from such kind of transformation.
12Please note, the relation yH1
sc <y H1
c is assumed also after education.
14Only self-protection
Now, only self-protection is implemented with π￿
i(E) > 0 and δ￿(E)=0 . Then, the
necessary condition for education with EU￿(E) > 0 under use of (8) is:
πEU
￿








































k (θ2)+( 1− π2)u
H2￿
c ) (21)
The left-hand side represents the income eﬀect. Under a pure self-protection (20) and
(21) are positive due to a negative income eﬀect. The right hand-side is the marginal gain
as a decrease of a potential utility loss through a false self-diagnosis (within the brackets),




dE .F o rah i g hv a l u e
of π,e d u c a t i o nb e c o m e sm o r er e a s o n a b l ed u et ot h eh i g h e rw e i g h to nt h ep r o b a b l yh i g h e r
potential loss in case H1. The impact of illness severity is equal for both health states.
An increasing severity increases the incentive for education.13 If c is dominant (14) is
valid again and education is left undone. Furthermore, as long as δ￿(E)=0the ﬁrst best
solution (4) without education is the maximum value of the ex-ante expected utility. Even
if the eﬀectiveness of E is high and πi =1can be achieved, (4) cannot be achieved due to
am i n i m u mo fn e c e s s a r ye x p e n d i t u r e sE>0. Despite a negative income-eﬀect education
remains beneﬁcial if the shift to the correct positive or negative diagnosis increases the
expected utility and compensates the expected income loss.
Self-insurance and self-protection
Now, let us combine self-insurance and self-protection with δ￿(E) > 0 and π￿
i(E) > 0.
Then, (19) is fulﬁlled as long as the income eﬀect is positive or a negative one is com-
pensated by a decrease of a potential loss. In addition, on the right-hand side of (19) the
utility values after education are presented. Then, the more eﬀective education according
to δ the higher the potential loss in the case H2 but the lower in case H1 due to decreasing
marginal costs αq￿




c the decrease of loss for H1 com-




dE ,s e l f - i n s u r a n c er e d u c e st h e
13Education is less attractive if one illness is most likely to occur with π =1and π1(π1 = 1) = 1 as a
perfect correlation between the objective and the error probability.
15eﬀect of self-protection. Then, self-insurance partially substitutes self-protection, specif-
ically for H1. Otherwise, a partially complementary relation exists for H2 in which the
eﬀectiveness of self-protection increases in the eﬀectiveness of self-insurance. Furthermore,
as long as c is dominant, (19) is not fulﬁlled due to a right-hand side of zero and a positive






perf is possible again if c is non-dominant. However, only in a case in which
E∗
imp = E∗
perf > 0 and πi =1after education the ﬁrst-best solution after education can be
achieved. Otherwise, E∗
imp can only implement a second-best solution speciﬁcally based
on the reasonable assumption of E →∞for πi → 1.
Finally, how is the impact of risk-aversion if self-protection is implemented? A thresh-




sc (θ2)+( 1− π2)uH2￿
c
h − g + π2u
H2￿








The impact of self-insurance was already discussed. The impact of self-protection is
focused on the diﬀerence of the absolute utility values. As can be easily seen in ﬁg. 2
given each net-income after education the diﬀerence of utility and therefore the potential
loss for H1 is larger for RA than for RN due to a higher marginal utility in the case of
RA if y<￿ y. Otherwise, for H2 the potential loss is higher for RN than for RA. Hence,
also for self-protection the impact of RA is ambiguous. The potential loss in a case of a
severe (banal) sickness is of a greater importance for the individual under RA (RN).
Again non-dominance can be induced under RN due to an increase of θ∗. Then, (19)
is relevant, however, connected to the speciﬁc incentive structure under RN.
To discuss (19) in more detail the second order condition for a maximum as a suﬃcient







































































c < 0 (24)
14Please note, c can remain also dominant if the gross-incomes are equalized and the variable costs for




























￿￿) < 0 (26)
For a detailed analysis of (23) the FOC (19) is implemented into the SOC through a
substitution of term four (see app. dev. 1). Then, EU￿￿ < 0 is more likely to be fulﬁlled




i are ambiguous in their impact, given that (25) is positive.
Firstly, |uH2￿
c | and uH2￿
sc should be low to achieve a maximum. Term seven shows that
an increase in the competence of self-diagnosis (π￿
2 > 0)d e c r e a s e st h er e l e v a n c eo fa
decreasing net-income for c(H2) but increases the weight of the positive income eﬀect for
sc(H2). This implies on the one hand the named positive expenditure eﬀect and on the
other hand the decrease of a potential risk of a utility loss through a false self-diagnosis.
Then, high values |uH2￿
c | and uH2￿
sc increase the value of maximum expected utility.
Secondly, a high value |uH1￿
c | supports the fulﬁllment of the SOC as the opposite to the
former eﬀect as a shift of the decision to c(H1) connected with a negative income eﬀect
(term three).
Thirdly, uH2￿






(see app.). As can be seen in term three, a shift of the decision from the positive to the
negative income eﬀect is supported by a strong eﬀectiveness π￿
1.H e n c e , uH1￿
sc should be
high. It should be low, however, if there is a strong decrease of marginal returns according
to self-diagnosis (π￿￿
i < 0) due a dilution of the former eﬀect.









1| (see app.). Hence, a strong decrease of marginal returns according to π2
reduces the eﬀectiveness in terms of a decrease of a potential loss through education.
Again, π￿
1 should be high. Term four presents a high degree of diminishing returns with









opposite. The reason is the substitution of term four through the FOC. A high value |π￿￿
2|
for H2 should compensate a positive risk decreasing eﬀect for H1 to support (23). The
opposite can be postulated if term eight would be substituted by the FOC.
Summarized, to realize a maximum of expected utility a shift from a positive to a
negative income eﬀect with a corresponding self-diagnosis competence and a diminishing
eﬀect of risk reduction are relevant. If constant returns with u￿￿
i =0are assumed these
eﬀects are necessary and suﬃcient for a maximum. In addition, π￿￿
i < 0 is also not neces-
sary for EU￿￿ < 0 (see app.).
15Please note, (26) must be negative (with N￿￿ > 0) with q￿￿
scδ￿2 > 0, q￿
scδ￿￿ > 0 and q￿￿
sc > 0, δ￿￿ ≤ 0.
Due to a maximum ¯ Ysc in the case of non-dominance of c an increase of δ decreases qsc,h o w e v e r ,t h e
decrease diminishes through H2 + δqsc = ¯ Y , which delivers q￿
scδ￿￿ > 0.
17In the case of pure self-protection with δ￿ =0 ,( 2 5 )i sn e g a t i v e . T e r mt h r e et u r n s
to a positive sign with |uH1￿
c | < |uH1￿
sc |. Then, an increase of π1 shifts the choice to c
attenuating the negative income eﬀect. Term seven with |uH2￿
sc | < |uH2￿
c | does not change
its sign, but decreases compared to the case with self-insurance because of the decreasing
but still existing advantage of shifting the choice to self-care.
In the case of pure self-insurance with π￿
2 =0 ,( 2 3 )s i m p l i ﬁ e st ot h es u mo ft h et e r m s
one, two, ﬁve and six. Then, a decreasing marginal utility is necessary and suﬃcient for
EU￿￿ < 0. This is clear due to the simple opposing eﬀect of an increase of utility for self-
care and a decrease for consultation both based on an increase of education expenditures.
Dominance vs. non-dominance
Connected to the shift from dominance to non-dominance the following has to be high-
lighted. Self-insurance increases uH2
sc above uH2
c .S e l f - p r o t e c t i o n c a n o n l y b e b e n e ﬁ c i a l
if c is non-dominant. Connected to the former, a false negative decision against H1 is
stimulated by education despite a possible increase of πi.A sl o n ga suH2
c >u H2
sc ,t h eﬁ r s t
best solution EUfb or EUfb(θ) is generated. However, if uH2
c <u H2
sc and uHi
sc (E) − u
Hi
cE(E)
is suﬃcient for θ2 <θ ∗,( 9 )b e c o m e sr e l e v a n t ,b u tEUfb or EUfb(θ) are not necessar-
ily exceeded. If θ2 <θ ∗ and πi =1 ,a ni n d u c e dn o n - d o m i n a n c ei su n p r o b l e m a t i ca n d
EUfb(E) >E U fb or EUfb(θ,E) >E U fb(θ) are achieved as long as E is suﬃciently low.
However, due to πi < 1 as the risk of a false self-diagnosis, (9) is not only below EUfb(E)
or EUfb(θ,E) but can also be below EUfb or EUfb(θ) with a dominant structure. sc
becomes more attractive in a case in which the individual decides in aid of H2 with a
remaining error probability 1−π1E > 0.H o w e v e r ,c remains the better alternative for H1
and a full dominance of c could be the better alternative. This could be interpreted as a
false self-conﬁdence or overassessment of the own abilities. Then, from an ex-ante point
of view, education is only beneﬁcial if the gain of expected utility for H2 compensates the





c (E)+( 1− π1E)u
H1









sc (E)+( 1− π2E)u
H2





The ﬁrst term in (27) must be negative and the second can be positive. Hence,
whether the total eﬀect of uH2
sc (E) − uH2
c > 0 is positive depends on πiE − πi > 0 and
the increase/decrease of the utility values in which risk aversion makes it more diﬃcult
to fulﬁll (27).
The former can also be interpreted as follows. From an ex-ante point of view a value
π<π ∗ exists for which non-dominance should be preferred. As long as π<π ∗, θ2 <θ ∗ is
18necessary to realize non-dominance as optimal solution.16 However, if θ2 <θ ∗ and π∗ <π ,
dominance of c should remain, however, education is carried out. Therefore, a possible
decrease of expected utility due to an extension of alternatives is based on a bias between
the factual a-priori risk of a severe illness and the subjective parameter of pessimism.
If θ2 cannot be inﬂuenced and non-dominance is the situation before education, ex-
penditures E can decrease θ∗. c can become dominant due to the implementation of E if
the income eﬀect is negative for self-care (see (6)). Then, uH2
c (E) <u H2
sc (E) still remains,
however, through risk aversion the diﬀerences between the utilities within each health
state increase. Self-care is reduced in its attractiveness, which is in fact desirable if the
expected utility under dominance after education exceeds the utility under non-dominance
before education.17 If θ∗ cannot be inﬂuenced suﬃciently to induce dominance, the focus
must be on a fulﬁllment of (19) with a corresponding inducement of education.
If a situation of non-dominance generates a higher expected utility than dominance
and if (19) is fulﬁlled, a decrease of θ∗ could be possible anyway, inducing dominance and
making (19) no longer fulﬁllable. Then, education should also be left undone.18
As a conclusion, dominance can be a second best solution without education if the
expected utility of c from an ex-ante point of view exceeds the expected utility of sc and
the competence of self-diagnosis is suﬃciently low. Due to the assumed decision struc-
ture under ambiguity this solution cannot be generated as long as non-dominance exists.
Then, non-dominance is a third-best solution, however, a change to dominance is possible
if θ∗ decreases suﬃciently due to education expenditures.
As an interim conclusion, if self-care is dominated by consultation through higher
utility values for each health state the ﬁrst best solution is realized. An extension of
strategies through self-care only produces a ﬁrst best solution if the optimal choices for
each kind of illness factually take place. However, this can only be realized if a perfect self-
diagnosis exists and the characteristic optimistic or pessimistic appreciation ex-post does
not produce a general decision of consultation. Otherwise, it could be beneﬁcial to turn
education, connected with an increase of productivity, down or reduce the attractiveness
of self-care generally if an extension of strategies reduces the ex-ante utility. However, if
an alternative strategy already exists self-insurance and speciﬁcally self-protection could
be used to close the gap between the ﬁrst and second best solution. Generally, education
can be interpreted either as a measure to strengthen patient autonomy or to weaken it in
that sense that the alternative of self-care is dominated.
16Please note, π∗ ￿= θ∗ due to π∗ also pays attention to the income eﬀect based on expenditures E.
17However, an increase through dominance is only possible if the necessary expenditures E are suﬃ-
ciently low.
18Another situation must also be attended. Non-dominance could be preferred to dominance, however,
θ∗ <θ 2. Then, education can also increase θ∗ if education improves the situation of sc relatively to
c. Then, non-dominance could be induced, which is in fact beneﬁcial as long as the expenditures for
education are suﬃciently low.
194E x - p o s t d e c i s i o n u n d e r u n c e r t a i n t y
In the following the ex-post decision is discussed as a decision under uncertainty distin-
guished into two cases: 1. ex-post knowledge about a-priori probabilities π,2 . e x - p o s t
knowledge about π and πi. The parameter θ is now excluded from the discussion and
replaced by the knowledge of probabilities. The ﬁrst best solution remains (4).
4.1 Ex-post knowledge about a-priori probabilities
Some knowledge exists in an acute indisposition about the disposition to fall ill according
to Hi.H e n c e ,π is taken into account to decide between c and sc,h o w e v e r ,t h es y m p t o m s
are not assessed in this moment. The ex-ante expected utility is:




k +( 1− π)u
H2
k ,k= c,sc (29)
The process of choice is equal to the decision under ambiguity, except a replacement
of θ by π. The threshold π∗ is given by (6). The choice is illustrated in ﬁg. 3 (bold lines).
-F i g u r e3-
π∗ decreases (increases) in a potential loss of H1 (H2). (6) cannot be fulﬁlled if c
is dominant with uH2
c >u H2
sc .F u r t h e r m o r e , s i m i l a r t o t h e d e c i s i o n u n d e r a m b i g u i t y , π∗
increases if the individual is risk neutral.
The decision is only based on the expected utilities calculated by the objective prob-
abilities for which reason only self-insurance is an outcome of education. According to π∗
the impact of education is:
π
∗￿(E)=( a + b)
−1(b






￿)) > 0 (30)
As can be easily seen π∗ increases if uHi
sc is increased and uHi
c decreased by education. This
is illustrated in ﬁg. 3 in which the threshold increases from π∗
0 to π∗
1 due to the simple
reason of a more beneﬁcial sc and a less c.19
π∗￿(E) does not inform about a welfare gain but only about the relation between the
expected utilities before and after education. 0 <π<π ∗
E represents the area of an
individual welfare gain. If education increases uHi
sc , π∗
E >π ∗
0 follows necessarily. Then, a
19Please note, if non-dominance exists only due to N<M , a￿ > 0 due to an increase of qsc (if N￿ is
small). This case is not discussed due to simpliﬁcation.

















Again, the expected utility must rise through education. Speciﬁcally π∗
0 <π<π ∗
E
represents the range for which sc turns to dominance after education. Hence, education
can increase dominance of sc. Education is inhibited for values of π for which the expected
value of c is dominant.
4.2 Education under conditional decision ex-post
So far, the competence of self-diagnosis is not in focus, which is, however, an important
dimension of patient autonomy. Hence, beside π the individual is also informed ex-post
about π and πi.H e n c e , t h e q u a l i t y o f a s i g n a l Ii in case Hi is known. Ii represents
the self-diagnosis Hi.Q u a l i t y m e a n s πi as the competence of a correct interpretation
of a symptom to derive Ii. The diagnosis and the choice between c or sc is conditional
on Hi and depends stochastically on it. This can be typically described by a-posteriori











= p22 ; p(H2,I 1)=




p(I1)=ππ1 +( 1− π)(1 − π2);p(I2)=π(1 − π1)+( 1− π)π2 (34)
















(34) represents the probabilities that signal Ii (self-diagnosis Hi)o c c u r s . ( 3 2 )[ 3 3 ]r e p -
resents the probabilities that H1 [H2]o c c u r sc o n d i t i o n a lt ot h es y m p t o mi si n t e r p r e t e d
as I1 or I2. The lower the quality of interpretation the lower p(H1,I 1) and p(H2,I 2).
Education increases the quality of the indicator (condition (35)) through an improvement
of the competence of self-diagnosis. The maximum value is achieved for πi =1with
p(H1,I 1)=p(H2,I 2)=1 . The competence of self-diagnosis becomes perfect and the
expected value from and ex-ante point of view is equal to (4), which must be higher than
(28) as long as c is non-dominant (with uc(y)H2 <u sc(y)H2).20 If πi < 1,t h ec o n d i t i o n a l
20Please note, the same result is produced by πi =0with p(H1,I 1)=p(H2,I 2)=0 .A t o t a l i n -
competence results in a turn to a full pseudo-competence with perfect information. Knowledge about
full incompetence delivers knowledge about the correct diagnosis as a simple reﬂection of a perfectly
21probabilities are relevant. The individual calculates the expected utility for each signal
to choose between c and sc. These are only two, one for I1 and the other for I2. Then,
similar to (28) the ex-ante expected utility can be calculated with use of ﬁg. 4:


















with s =1 ,2 and i =1 ,2. The expected utilities of c and sc are based on p11 and p21
if I1 arises and on p22 and p12 for signal I2.F r o ma ne x - a n t ep o i n to fv i e wt h eo c c u r r e n c e
of Ii is uncertain with p(Ii).H e n c e , t h e p a t i e n t ’ s q u a l i t y o f s e l f - d i a g n o s i s i s o f s p e c i ﬁ c
importance. Given the signal, a threshold level can be calculated to choose c or sc. The
threshold for choosing sc for each indicator I1 and I2 is:
p1i <b / (a + b) (37)
Let us assume that the individual consciously aﬀords Ii as a further information. Then,
an information value IV can be calculated as a diﬀerence between (28) and (36) in which
EU(π) − EU(p(Ii),p 1,p 2,E 0) ≤ 0 is strictly valid, which can be easily shown (see app.
dev. 2). IV represents the (conditional) increase of expected utility through the knowledge
about quality of self-diagnosis. To show IV more ostensively the representation from
Eeckhoudt (1984) is used. The situation is printed in ﬁg. 5a and 5b. Fig. 5a shows the
π IV
0 ≤ π∗ ≤ z 0
z ≤ π∗ ≤ b
a+b aπ1π − b(1 − π2)(1 − π)
b
a+b ≤ π∗ ≤ z a(π1 − 1)π + bπ2
s(1 − π)
z ≤ π∗ ≤ 1 0
Table 4: Function of the information value
diﬀerences between the expected utility with and without further diagnosis information,
e.g. IV1 and IV2. Fig. 5b represents tab. 5 in which IV depends on π.
-F i g u r e5a / b-
It is assumed that p12 <p 11 with π1 + π2 > 1.21 It is reasonable to assume π1 <π 2.
Then, z =
b(1−π2)
π1a+b(1−π2) and z =
bπ2
(1−π1)a+bπ2 is valid. Following Pauker and Kassirer (1980),
wrong diagnosis. However, in these cases education makes no sense according to improve competence
self-diagnosis, but only to increase the productivity of self-care. This is diﬀerent to the case without any
ex-post knowledge about probabilities. There, education could make sense for low values πi because the
individual could not infer something from πi ex-post.
21p12 >p 11 is also thinkable. However, to hold the analysis as simple as possible only p12 <p 11 is
discussed which does not inﬂuence the results signiﬁcantly.
22π<z(z<π ) represents a threshold for which sc (c)i sc h o s e ni n d e p e n d e n t l yf r o ma
self-diagnosis. z can be easily calculated with p11 smaller than the threshold (37). The
decision is in aid of sc independently of the signal. Without the use of Ii,( 6 )a l s od e l i v e r s
sc as optimal, hence, IV =0and sc is dominant. This kind of dominance was not
possible without information ex-post. But now, dominance can exist according to an
expected value. In ﬁg. 5a this is valid for p11 <π ∗
0 and the corresponding expected utility
value on curve EUsc.
Not before π rises above z, IV increases as long as the threshold level of π is in the
interval of line two in tab. 4. If I1 occurs c is chosen, but sc remains optimal for the
individual if I2 occurs. Without a signal the decision is also sc.I nt h a tc a s eal i n eEU(Ii)
(or (36)) can be drawn in ﬁg. 5a between p￿
11 and p￿
12 on EUc and EUsc,r e p r e s e n t i n gt h e
expected utility under use of imperfect information. At π￿,t h es e c o n dl i n ei nt a b .4c a n
be represented as IV1. Then, it can also be seen that an increase of π to π￿￿ shifts EU(Ii)
due to an increase of p￿￿
11 and p￿￿
12. IV also increases until π = π∗
0. The printed example
shows π￿￿ >π ∗
0. The choice without a signal is c and it remains c with signal I1 but is
sc with I2. IV takes on the value of the third line in tab. 4 and IV2 in ﬁg. 5a. If line
four becomes relevant p11 and p12 are above the threshold and c is chosen deﬁnitely with
IV =0 , which means dominance of c.
Please note, dominance can exist again through uH2
c >u H2
sc as in the chapter before.
Then of course, IV becomes also zero for every value of π.
Tab. 4 can be translated into ﬁg. 5b, which represents the diﬀerences between the
curves EUc,EU sc and EU(Ii,π). The maximum is IVmax =
ab(π1+π2−1)
a+b , which increases
in π1 and π2 with IVmax = ab
a+b under perfect information. Fig. 5b shows also the curve
for perfect information IV perf, which must always dominate IV nonperf.I nﬁ g .5 aEU(Ii)
shifts to p11 =1and p12 =0 .G i v e nav a l u eπ the relation IV(π)nonperf/IV (π)perf can be
interpreted as a measure of the competence of self-diagnosis.
As can be seen in ﬁg. 5a/b and tab. 4, if a positive information value arises, the
diﬀerences a and b are relevant according to the attitude of EU(Ii) and the amount of
IV.H e n c e ,d u et ot h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o no fc o n d i t i o n a lp r o b a b i l i t i e si n c l u d i n g πi the loss
within one health stage based on a false self-diagnosis is of importance for IV.
Finally, if the individual is risk neutral, a and b increase (see ﬁg. 2/3). It follows, that
the thresholds z and z must increase leading to a shift of a positive information value to
the right. The reason is that sc is more attractive and often chosen, hence, sc becomes
relevant independent of the diagnosis for a higher range of π.
Education and the information value
Now, the inﬂuence of education under an imperfect quality of self-diagnosis is analysed.
23Education inﬂuences p(Ii), psi with s =1 ,2 and i =1 ,2 based on π￿
i(E) > 0 as well as
a and b.A sl o n ga sIVAnonperf <I VA perf education can increase IV due to an increase
of p11 and p22.H o w e v e r ,i fa (b)d e c r e a s e s( i n c r e a s e s ) ,IV also decreases (increases). The
reason is the reduced (increased) loss in the case of false self-diagnosis. The thresholds in












(1 − π2)/π2 (ηb,E − ηa,E − ηπ1,E) >η π2,E
(1 − π2)/π2 (ηb,E − ηa,E − ηπ1,E)=ηπ2,E













(1 − π1)/π1 (ηa,E − ηb,E − ηπ2,E) <η π1,E
(1 − π1)/π1 (ηa,E − ηb,E − ηπ2,E)=ηπ1,E
(1 − π1)/π1 (ηa,E − ηb,E − ηπ2,E) >η π1,E
(39)
with ηπ2,E,η π1,E > 0 and ηb,E > 0, ηa,E < 0. z and z increase in an increasing ηb,E
and |ηa,E|. As can be seen in (37) an increase of the utility diﬀerence between c and sc
for H2 (value b)i n c r e a s e st h et h r e s h o l dl e v e lp1i for which sc is chosen. sc increases in
its attractiveness. This is also valid for a decrease of the utility diﬀerence between c and
sc for H1 (value a) due to a decreasing value of loss in the case of a wrong self-diagnosis
according to H1.H e n c e , z is shifted to the right by education if a and b are sensitive.
As can be seen in ﬁg. 5a, if EUsc is shifted upwards and EUc downwards the range for
which EU(Ii) is located completely on EUsc increases. Otherwise, the range of IV > 0
shifts to the left if the sensitivities of a and b are too low. z is shifted to the left if π1
or π2 increases strongly because p11 increases and p12 decreases as an improvement of the
quality of self-diagnosis. Therefore, given π, IV must increase. The later is also valid
for z, which is shifted to the right. Summarized, a high sensitivity of a and b shifts the
whole triangle to the right. A high eﬀectiveness of education according to an increase of
πi broaden the basis of the triangle.22 The relation between these sensitivities determines




The relation depends on the relative eﬀectiveness according to a and b.
In the case of pure self-insurance with ηπ2,E = ηπ1,E =0 ,( 3 8 )a n d( 3 9 )a r ep o s i t i v e
and the area of a positive information value shifts to the right. The reason is that
only the advantageousness of sc increases relative to c and the range for which sc is
chosen independently of the indicator increases. If only self-protection is implemented
with ηa,E > 0 and ηb,E > 0,t h ep o t e n t i a lo fan e g a t i v ev a l u eo f( 3 8 )a n d( 3 9 )i n c r e a s e s
in which z and z decrease if ηa,E >η b,E. The ﬁnal direction of the shift of the range of a
positive IV depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of the conditional probabilities.
22In the case of p12 >p 11 education shifts z to the right and z to the left which reduces the area of
IV > 0.H o w e v e r ,p12 <p 11 is achieved for a correspondent impact of education on πi.
24The structure of both IV-functions in tab. 4 remains after education. As can also be
seen, the critical values for IV =0are π =0and π =1for perfect information, which
cannot be changed by education. However, IV perf
max increases in b and decreases in a. The
reason is the decrease of the potential loss between c and sc in stage H1, which makes it
less worthwhile to have further information e. g. the interpreted symptom.
Education under imperfect information
After discussing the principle exposure of IV and its dependence on π the incentive to
invest in education shall be discussed. As it was already shown E inﬂuences the thresh-
old of the decision between c and sc and also the area in which the implementation of
the symptoms’ interpretation increases the value of information. However, ﬁg. 5b is not
adequate enough to analyze the impact of education according to a welfare gain because
only the relation between utilities with and without information are indicated. To show
the satisfying conditions for education I derive them graphically at ﬁrst. Let us use the
case in ﬁg. 3 plotted again in ﬁg. 5.
-ﬁ g u r e6-
Education shifts the expected utility curves from EUk to EUk(E) with k = c,sc due
to an increase of uHi
sc and a decrease of uHi
c .F u r t h e r m o r e , e d u c a t i o n d e c r e a s e s p12 to
p12E and increases p11 to p11E.H e n c e ,t h ec u r v eo ft h ec o n d i t i o n a le x p e c t e du t i l i t ys h i f t s
from EU(I) to EUE(I) for a given value π. Now, the bold line represents the maximum
expected utility for a given value of π. Education is not optimal for each π.23 Necessarily,
EUsc(E) or EU(I,E) must have an intersection with EUc or EU(I) for a beneﬁcial
education with a corresponding maximum value of π∗∗ >π . Then, an intersection of
EUsc(E) is suﬃcient for education because EU(I,E) is equal or higher than EUsc(E).
This also means that as long as IV >0 under education and EUsc(E) has any intersection,
π∗∗ increases through the use of a symptom as an indicator for self-diagnosis.24
Fig. 6 shows a speciﬁc situation after education in which π<π ∗∗ is the range in which
education is utility maximizing. In this case EU(I,E) has an intersection with EU(I):
bEπ2E + uH2
c (E) − bπ2 − uH2
c








c + aπ1 − aEπ1E
>π
1∗∗ (40)
23Only EUk and EUk(E) remain constant when π changes. However, EU(I) and EU(I,E) shift to the
right when π increases as it was indicated in tab. 4. An increase or decrease of π increases or decreases
IV in which EU(I) must lie within the range of EU(I,E).F o r v e r y h i g h a n d v e r y l o w v a l u e s o f π
both areas of positive IV are zero and EUk(E) is of relevance after education. The value π∗∗ as critical
probability for eﬀort in education also shifts with π due to a shift of EU(I,E).
24This does not mean another π compared to the situation without education. π is not inﬂuenced by
education. A shifted π changes the whole position of EU(I) and EU(I,E).H e n c e ,g i v e na ni d e n t i c a lv a l u e
π before and after education, education becomes beneﬁcial only due to the use of further information.
25π1∗∗￿ ∆πi bE − b a − aE |∆uH2
c | |∆uH1
sc |
SI and SP + + - - +
only SI 0 + - - +
only SP + + + - -
Table 5: Education threshold and its derivative
Condition (40) is valid for IV >0 and line two and three in tab. 4 respectively. Tab.
5 shows the derivatives of (40). Under self-insurance and self-protection the threshold of
education π1∗∗ increases in ∆πi
s or the eﬀectiveness of education on the quality of diagnosis.
In addition, π1∗∗ increases (decreases) in bE−b (a−aE)o rt h ec h a n g eo ft h ep o t e n t i a ll o s s
in stage H2 (H1). This does not mean a necessary increase of the expected utility due to an
increase of the diﬀerences between the health stages.25 Speciﬁcally, a decreases in which
uH1
sc increases but uH1
c decreases. b increases with a decreasing uH2
c but an increase of uH2
sc .
As can be seen in ﬁg. 6 a decrease of uHi
c decreases π1∗∗ but an increase of uHi
sc increases
π1∗∗. The decreasing eﬀect of uH1
c and the increasing eﬀect of uH2
sc is already considered in
(40) by bE−b and a−aE.H o w e v e r ,t h e s ep o t e n t i a ll o s s e sm u s tb ea d j u s t e db y|∆uH2
c | and
|∆uH1
sc |. π1∗∗ decreases in the ﬁrst and increases in the latter. This point more speciﬁcally
concerns the income eﬀect for the relevant values given the intersection (40). Education
becomes more relevant if the negative income eﬀect is low and the positive is high. In
other words the threshold depends on the level of income and illness severity respectively
in which risk aversion must be considered. Summarized, the increase of a potential loss
as a stimulation of education cannot be observed in isolation but opposed to the income
loss through education. A decrease of utility must be compensated by an increase of uHi
sc
similar to condition (19). The potential loss through a false self-diagnosis is of relevance
for education if the probabilities of error are of relevance as it is the case in (40).
In the case of pure self-insurance, π1∗∗ decreases due to πiE = πi.I n a d d i t i o n , t h e
potential loss of utility remains relevant also for self-insurance due the use of information,
speciﬁcally within the intersection between EU(I,E) and EU(I). The reason for this
is the information value, which is inﬂuenced by a potential utility loss. In the previous
chapter the value of loss was not of importance for self-insurance. If only self-protection
is implemented, the threshold increases in bE − b and a − aE due to risk-aversion and
decreases in |∆uH1
sc | due to uH1
sc −uH1
sc (E) > 0.I nt h ec a s eo fp u r es e l f - i n s u r a n c ee d u c a t i o n
is beneﬁcial due to the decrease of the negative income-eﬀect through education. On the
other hand, if only self-protection is possible the decrease of the risk of a potential loss
stimulates education in which a positive eﬀect on the information value increases this kind
25For p12 >p 11 education reduces the diﬀerence between both probabilities. Hence, the incentive to
invest in education is also reduced as long as p12 >p 11 remains unchanged because of a reduced IV due
to relative identical values p1i.
26of stimulation.26
The following conditions are alternative suﬃcient conditions for which education be-
comes utility maximizing. The principal mechanisms were explained earlier. For that
reason the further explanations are condensed.
If uHi
sc is more increased than above, risk aversion increases uH1
sc more than uH2
sc . Then,
EUsc(E) shifts to the right with an intersection with EUc (not drawn). Education is
utility maximizing if EUsc(E) >E U c equal to (31): (31):
uH2













(41) is suﬃcient for education also with IV =0and π∗
0E >p 11E (not drawn). As
can be seen neither a nor b are elements of (41). Hence, the potential loss of utility and
therefore an element, which stimulates education is not relevant. However, due to the
intersection with EUc only the utility after education for sc(Hi) is of speciﬁc relevance.
This is clear because in this speciﬁc intersection, IV =0and πi is not relevant for
a decrease of the expected loss as in (40) which also means that self-protection is not
relevant. For π∗
0E <p 11E and π∗
0E >p 12E (π3∗∗ > z must not be valid) a value π3∗∗ >π 2∗∗
exists because EU(I,E) is necessarily located right to EUsc(E). π3∗∗ can be calculated
as intersection between EU(I,E)and EUc:
bEπ2E + uH2













The use of the symptom as information increases the range of π for which education
is utility maximizing. Now, aEπ1E and bEπ2E and the income loss through education but
not a and b are relevant. The reason is that in (40) curve EU(Ii) is inﬂuenced by a and
b, which is, however, not relevant in the speciﬁc intersection of (42). Of course, (42) can
remain valid if (41) is invalid due to an intersection of EUsc(E) and EU(I) with π4∗∗ (not
drawn):
uH2




sc (E) − bπ2 − u
H2







As can be seen for this speciﬁc intersection aπ2 and bπ1 have a negative impact on
π4∗∗ but aEπ1E and bEπ2E are not of relevance. EU(Ii,E) has no impact on this speciﬁc
intersection for which reason an increase of πi to decrease the impact of a potential loss
is not relevant.
Finally, as already mentioned an intersection between EUsc(E) and EUsc is impossible
due to an increase of uH1
sc .
26Please note, as already discussed in ch. 3, a partially substitution takes place between self-insurance
and self-protection, however, also a partially complementary relation arises for H2. The increase of π1 is
compensated partially by decrease of a.
27Summarized, in the case with knowledge about probabilities ex-post as decision sup-
port a welfare rising education can be calculated with a threshold condition according to
π. The lower the productivity gain to compensate the negative income eﬀect in strategy
c the lower the range of π for which a positive education eﬀect takes place. Further-
more, due to risk aversion the level of illness severity and therefore net-income are of
importance. Beside eﬀects on productivity, subjective error probabilities can be imple-
mented. These are decreased by education with p(I1)=π, p(I2)=1− π, p11 = p22 =1 ,
p21 = p12 =0as maximum values which produce a maximum expected utility (4) (with a
reduced net-income). An information value can be calculated, inﬂuenced by risk aversion
and education. The increase of πi (self-protection) stimulates eﬀort in education through
an increase of z−z or the information value respectively. On the other hand, the increas-
ing or decreasing values of a potential risk through education (self-insurance) increase or
decrease the information value. A threshold of a maximum value π for which education
is beneﬁcial can be calculated. This value increases through the use of symptoms as an
indicator as long as the information value is positive.
Furthermore, dominance of sc due to dominance of an expected value does not inhibit
education. Otherwise, if c is dominant with EUc >E U sc, which depends on π,e d u c a t i o n
is inhibited. Then, πi or uH2
sc must increase suﬃciently to make education beneﬁcial. Fur-
thermore, if c becomes dominant, as in the previous chapter, education only makes sense if
uH2
sc (E) exceeds uH2
c in which a threshold value π∗∗ exists again for which EUsc(E) >E U c.
Then, EU(I,E) can become relevant again as explained earlier.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Summarized, as it is intuitively clear, as long as speciﬁc medical education increases self-
care productivity (self-insurance) and the competence of self-diagnosis (self-protection),
patient autonomy is supported and a welfare gain becomes possible through a more eﬃ-
cient allocation of resources. Education is inhibited if consultation is a dominant strategy
either through subjective pessimism and quality of self-diagnosis or an objective supe-
rior consultation. However, education can induce the risk of utility loss. A situation is
possible, where dominance should remain and education should be left undone. Then,
investments in education or in a speciﬁc measure in general could also be used to induce a
dominance of consultation as a superior solution to non-dominance to maximize individual
welfare. More speciﬁcally, the risk and the level of a severe illness and also speciﬁc ﬁxed
costs for self-care, which is typically the reason for the choice of consultation, reduces the
incentive of self-care and education, particularly if dominance exists before education is
conducted. Under uncertainty ex-post, an information value can be generated, which is
extended by education. The education threshold can be extended by the use of symptoms
28as an information source.
There are some limitations and needs for further research. In the case of illness, a
total isolation of the individual seems to be unrealistic, speciﬁcally the assumption of
the extreme strategy of pure self-care. The inﬂuence of the health care system and its
professionals must be attended. Concepts of PPR developed as a form between pure pa-
ternalism and pure autonomy as partnerships are currently the most realistic scenarios.
However, a possible transfer of competence from physician to the individual, also in case
of prevention, is often a target of these concepts. The physician plays an active role in
promoting this competence to generate a more autonomous behaviour in the individual.
The question must be answered to what extent a release of the individual from actors
of the health care system in the sense of a real autonomy, including responsibility and
productivity, can be a realistic and also a desirable target. From an ethical perspective,
self-responsibility must actually be encouraged, however, characteristics of medical care
can have a serious inhibiting impact. These impacts must be analyzed more extensively
than in the framework I have used in this paper. In this context, uncertainty and informa-
tion on the side of the medical professionals according to appropriate treatments discussed
by Phelps (1992) is another interesting element. In this context, certainty about quality
of treatment was assumed in the ex-post case. However, this element is often discussed
as uncertain. In addition, the problem of liability in the case of medical malpractice is
of interest, either for self-care or consultation. Liability can inhibit self-care if it is asym-
metric. Furthermore, time and discounting of prospective utilities play also an important
role for individual decision processes in health care and are interesting elements to extend
on. Finally, the implementation of prevention as an inﬂuence of objective probabilities is
reasonable as well as the impact of insurance coverage either for consultation or self-care
as well.
Another important point is the real capacity to assess objective and subjective prob-
abilities as a laymen with and without education. Diﬀerent kinds of risks are diﬀerent in
their ability to be assessed and their potential to improve assessment through adequate
education measures. Hence, the rational choice is of course a point, which is not able to be
realized. However, the question arises which level of knowledge is achievable; are the costs
for this justiﬁable and is knowledge alone suﬃcient for rational behaviour in health care.27
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Appendix
Deviation 1
To calculate the suﬃcient condition for a maximum, using (19), uH1
c (E) − uH1
sc (E)=z in




















































































k < 0, z and terms three, seven and eight must be analyzed. z1 and three can






























1A3 combined are negative. For that reason |uH1￿
c | has a positive











1 as necessary for a positive impact of uH1￿
sc .





































1 for a positive impact of sign of
uH2￿
sc , which, however, cannot be fulﬁlled for which reason uH2￿
sc should be small for realizing












1 is generated as
necessary for a positive impact of uH2￿
c , which can also not be fulﬁlled. Hence, uH2￿
c should
be small.
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1|.H e n c e ,t h ep o t e n t i a ll o s sf o rH2 supports a maximum of
the expected utility if the degree of diminishing returns π￿￿
2 is high.
Deviation 2

















This condition is equal to (36). However, if information are implemented the optimal
strategy can diﬀer compared to a case without information. If c or sc is optimal without


























with ˜ k =˜ c, ˜ sc as optimal choice without information. The value within the brackets
for both I1 and I2 is zero and therefore also IV in its minimum if the chosen strategy does
not diﬀer between the diﬀerent levels of information. Further information does not inﬂu-
ence patient’s choice. If the information about quality of self-diagnosis is implemented
a diﬀerent strategy is chosen if the expected utility exceeds the value generated without
information and the value within the brackets becomes positive.
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